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of the New York Bar
To "look a gift horse in the mouth" has ever been deemed the
acme of ingratitude and it is quite possible that the action of a
successful litigant in questioning the ratio decidendi of an illus-
trious court in giving judgment in his favor may seem equally
worthy of censure. Since, however, the question of the effect to
be given to chattel-mortgage and conditional bill of sale record-
ing acts, where the property affected is removed beyond the juris-
diction, is one upon which learned courts have radically 'differed,
it may not be amiss to call attention to the difference and attempt
to reach a correct solution upon pure legal theory.
The decision which brings this interesting point of Conflict of
Laws actively to our attention is contained in the case of Mergen-
thaler Linotype Company vs. Hull, recently decided by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (239 Fed. Rep. 26).
The Mergenthaler Company conveyed to the Porto Rico Progress
Publishing Company two linotype machines under what, for the
present purposes, we may consider conditional bills of sale. The
contracts provided that the machines should be delivered to a car-
rier in New York for transportation to the vendee in Porto Rico,
should be considered as received by the vendee upon such delivery
and should, upon arrival in Porto Rico, be installed in a certain
place and not removed therefrom. The deferred payments were
to be made in Porto Rico and in fact everyihing affecting the trans-
action was performed or contemplated to be performed in Porto
Rico except the formal execution of the contracts and the delivery
to the carrier. The contracts were not recorded anywhere. The
machines duly arrived in Porto Rico and were there 'set up and
used for about four years. Finally the vendee became bankrupt
before the purchase price had been completely paid and its trustee
claimed ownership of the machines released from the condition.
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The question as to whether New York or Porto Rican law
governed the transaction was fully discussed by the court which
determines that New York law must control and which awarded
the machines to the Mergenthaler Company on that theory. A
convenient avenue of escape from decision of the point was open
in view of the fact that under either law the Mergenthaler Com-
pany would be entitled to prevail but the court declined to avail
itself of this way out.
For the sake of discussion let us assume the erroneous position
of the court below to the effect that the New York conditional bill
of sale and chattel mortgage recording Acts are identical and that
failure to record in the former as well as in the latter case renders
the condition invalid as to creditors without notice. On this sup-
position, which would place the New York Statute on a par with
those of most other States the Mergenthaler Company would have
been entitled to recover if Porto Rican law governed, but not if
New York law controlled.
A recording act of this variety is merely a statute declaratory
of public policy. The very fact that there is no uniformity in such
enactments conclusively demonstrates that the policy of various
jurisdictions differs on this as on other points. Where such laws
eist, the policy may be st~ited to the effect that the State feels that
one dealing with another, should be entitled to rely upon ocular
evidence of ownership in the absence of some public record to the
contrary. (Vreeland v. Pratt, 42 N. Y. St. Rep. 582, 17 N. Y.
Supp. 307.) The requirements regarding place of filing are practi-
cally the only points of general uniformity in such statutes in the
various States. They usually require the record to be made in
the place most easy of access to those who might be expected to
deal with the possessor or to be influenced by the possession.
The New York Chattel Mortgage Act is typical on this point
and requires record at the place of the mortgagor's residence, or, if
he be a non-resident, at the place of the location of the property in
question (Lien Law § 232). This tells the whole story of the
purpose of the Act. If A. applies to B. for credit, the most natural
place for B. to inform himself as to A.'s responsibility is at the
latter's residence. If A. has property located elsewhere, the place
would also be one of interest since in case credit were extended
and A. defrauded, B. would look first to his debtor and then to
his debtor's property for satisfaction. A public record in either
place to the effect that property which A. appeared to own really
belonged to another would therefore be helpful to the prospective
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creditor in determining whether or not his customer was worthy,
but any other record would be a nugatory act. (See Dillingham v.
Bolt, 37 N. Y. 198.) To put a case which is readily conceivable,
suppose the seller to be a company with a dozen or more different
factories, located in as many localities. The filing of the chattel
mortgage or conditional bill of sale other than at the residence of
the debtor or the place where the property was located would, so
far as assistance to a later prospective creditor is concerned, be
a nugatory act since as a matter of practical business, in order to
make sure that his customer owned the property in question he
would be obliged to search the records in a dozen different localities.
Or suppose the case of a second hand machine sold by one other
than the manufacturer: the one dealing with the apparent owner
might be obliged for safety to inspect every record in every town
and county in the entire country. As was appropriately said in
reply to a similar contention by Judge Platt in Re Greene (134
Fed. 137, 139):
"To sustain the coritention of the objecting creditors in
the case before me would be unfortunate from any point of
view. It might be subversive of a bedrock principle of
commercial life, and, at best, it would lead to the necessity
for adopting complicated and useless details in order that
validity might attach to a very simple transaction."
To sum up this phase of the question, it is an axiom that the
law will not require a vain thing and it is submitted that to make
the rights of creditors depend on whether or not a conditional
vendor did or did not file a copy of its contracts with the V;endee
in some County Clerk's office possibly a thousand or more miles
across the sea on some date several years before, amounts to little
short of a vain thing.
But let us view the matter from a somewhat different stand-
point. All rights must be acquired as a result of law. Theoretically
at least, the operation of law in the acquisition and divesting of
rights is a thing with which every man is familiar, but one of the
points most firmly grounded in the rules of evidence is that a
foreign statute must be proved like any other fact. How, then can
subsequent creditors in different States or jurisdictions be expected
to take cognizance of the statutory enactments of the distant locality
where the sale takes place? When any such transaction occurs in
the usual case there are two and only two parties interested therein.
If the sale takes place in the State of New York, New York law
should properly be looked to for the purpose of deciding what legal
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effects flowed from the acts which made up the transactions as
between the only actors therein. New York and every other law
says that as between the parties thereto, the condition in a condi-
tional bill of sale is valid irrespective of filing. (Frank v. Batten,
49 Hun, 91, 94, 1 N. Y. Supp. 705, 706; Rodney Hunt Machine Co.
v. Stewart, 57 Hun, 545, 11 N. Y. Supp. 448, 451; Re Carcewich,
115 Fed. 87, 8 Am. Bcy. Rep. 149, 151.) With the status of the
property thus determined, it leaves the jurisdiction where the trans-
action of sale has occurred and, on our supposition, is removed to
another locality and becomes subject to the laws of another
sovereign. The status of the property at the moment of its de-
parture from the first jurisdiction is simply that the vendee has
possession while the vendor has title. There is nothing illegal or
monstrous in such an arrangement, and it was almost universally
held valid at common law. (Bierce Ltd. v. Hutchings, 205 U. S.
340, 347; Empire State Type Foundry Co. v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40,
44-45, 21 N. E. Rep. 49; Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 666,
670; Hewett v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296, 301-303, 11
Am. Bcy. Rep. 709; Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314, 316; Austin
v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500, 502.) This legal relation would have con-
tinued even in the original jurisdiction had the property remained
there if a third individual in the form of a creditor had not sub-
sequently acquired a potential interest in the article. The record-
ing act is of importance only to creditors and on our supposition
there are no such individuals so long as the property is in a position
to be subject to the courts and laws of the place of sale. Whether
the status of the property given it by the laws of the jurisdiction
where the sale takes place will continue in the new locality to which
it is removed depends solely on the public policy of the latter as
evidenced by its laws. Such public policy might decree that the
mere presence of the article within its jurisdiction was invalid as
in.the case of liquor in certain prohibition States or it might do any
one of many conceivable things. The only point of interest, how-
ever, is that whatever the laws of the locality to which the property
is removed determines, that is the thing of importance. The
legal effect of any act must be determined by the law of the place
where the act occurs and likewise the legal resulti of any status
or relation must be decided by the laws which give rise thereto.
If after the removal of the property to the new jurisdiction an
injury were done to it, its law must determine the right to com-
pensation and the measure of damages. Likewise if by the per-
formance of certain acts the possessor of the property creates new
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business and legal relationships with certain individuals commonly
called creditors, the law which creates the relationship must de-
termine the results of the relationship both as regards the indi-
vidual himself and any property or rights which may be his or in
his possession (Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Whitmire, 195 Fed.
41, 43, 45, 47, 28 Am. Bcy. Rep. 235, 237, 241, 242; Matter of
Edward Hess, 14 Am. Bcy. Rep. 635, 643; Altman & Taylor Ma-
chinery Co. v. Kennedy, 114 Iowa 444, 447, 87 S. W. Rep. 435;
Fiske v. Peebles 13 N. Y. State Rep. 743, 745; Hall v. Cordell, 142
U. S. 116, 120; Re Greene, 134 Fed. 137, 139, 13 Am. Bcy. Re 504;
Dyke v. Erie R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 113, 116; Beggs & Co. v. Bartels,
73 Conn. 132, 133, 135, 46 Atl. Rep. 874). Instances where dif-
ferences of policy give rise to differing rights of creditors are
readily found in the exemption statutes in various States.
To make the lex situs in such cases the criterion of the rights
of the parties not only makes for convefiience of creditors but also
works for justice to the vendor in the vast majority of cases, since
as a practical matter the intended use of the article sold and its
expected destination are almost always known to conditional
vendors. Where that destination is within another jurisdiction
in which the final acts of the conditional sale are to take place,
such law properly becomes a part of the contract and its applica-
tion is just to all concerned. As was said by Lord Escher in
Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Teleg. Co. (1891-1 Q. B. 79, 82):
"the business sense of all business men has come to this con-
clusion, that if a contract is made in one country to be car-
ried out between the parties in another country either in
whole or in part, unless there appears something to the
contrary, it is to be concluded that the parties must have
intended that it should be carried out according to the law
of that other country."
This principle of law is so well established that almost number-
less sustaining citations could be given (Cox v. United States,-6
Pet. (U. S.) 172, 201; Potter Mfg. Co. v. Arthur, 220 Fed. 843,
845; 34 Am. Bcy. R. 75, 76; Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley 150 Fed.
510, 517, 18 Am. Bcy. R. 35, 43; Altman & Taylor Machinery Co.
v. Kennedy, 114 Iowa, 444, 447, 87 N. W. Rep. 435, Chillingworth
v. Eastern Tin Ware Co., 66 Conn. 306, 33 Atl. Rep. 1011 ; Hyde v.
Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266, 269; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 227;
Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116, 120; Re Legg, 96 Fed. 326, 327;
Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. (U. S.) 169, 181 ; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet.
(U. S.) 65, 78).
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Fortunately the result here advocated and, in part, the prin-
ciples enunciated are not without judicial approval. In the case
of Southern Hardware & Supply Co. v. Clark (201 Fed. 1), the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit passed upon a some-
what similar state of facts. The claimants, in Alabama, sold an
automobile on conditional sale to a resident of Florida. Alabama
had a statute requiring filing of such contracts to make them
valid against creditors. Florida had no such statute. The con-
tract was not filed. In ruling that the creditors of the vendee had
no rights in the property the court says at page 3:
"The Alabama statute, of course, has no extra terri-
torial force to require registration of instruments in
Florida and is not applicable to this case."
In Marvin Safe Company vs. Norton (48 N. J. 410, 7 Atl.
Rep. 418), the Supreme Court of New Jersey presents a very
ably argued exposition of the same doctrine. There plaintiff sold
a safe to one Schwartz in Pennsylvania, the laws of which re-
quired record of a conditional bill of sale to cut off subsequent
bona fide purchasers. The contract of sale contemplated delivery
of the safe to a carrier for shipment to the vendee in New Jersey.
The vendee subsequently sold to the defendant in New Jersey
and the court held that in spite of failure 'to file the contract as
provided by the Pennsylvania statute, the vendor's title was not
cut off.
A similar result was reached under somewhat similar facts
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case of Public Parks
Amusement Co. v. Embree-McLean Carriage Co. (64 Ark. 29,
40 S. W. Rep. 582), where carriages were purchased in Missouri,
the statutes of which required filing, and removed to Arkansas,
where no such requirement existed.
It is therefore believed, both on principle and authority that
chattel mortgages or conditional sale contracts are not within
the contemplation of recording acts in cases where the m6rtgagor
or vendee is not a resident of the jurisdiction where the transac-
tion takes place, when there is merely a transient possession in
such jurisdiction, and that the adoption of a contrary view, far
from lending that additional assistance to the business world
which is the basic reason for such enactments would, in a ma-
jority of cases, introduce hardship and uncertainty into other-
wise simple business transactions.
